











This	 essay	 examines	 the	 interrelation	 between	 societal	 identity—specifically,	 the	mix	 of	
sectarianism	 and	 nationalism—and	 state	 formation	 in	 the	 Middle	 East.	 The	 dominant	
political	science	view	associates	strong,	inclusive	states	with	nationalism;	conversely,	those	
excluded	 in	weak	 or	 non-inclusive	 states	may	well	 embrace	 sub-state	 identities	 such	 as	
sectarianism	(Wimmer	2002).	These	expectations	are	 likely	valid	over	 the	historical	 long	
run;	yet	 they	hardly	exhaust	 the	possibilities,	and	 indeed	 the	more	complex	and	variable	
“actually	existing”	politics	 in	MENA	states	 is	 located	“between”	 the	 two	poles.	This	paper	
makes	a	start	at	uncovering	these	more	complex	dynamics.		
	 The	paper	brings	together	literatures	on	identity	and	on	state	formation	in	order	to	
identify	 the	key	variables	necessary	 to	understand	their	 inter-relation.	 It	 first	establishes	
the	structural	context	in	which	state	formation	has	taken	place	in	MENA,	namely	the	flawed	
export	 of	 Westphalian	 statehood	 to	 the	 region.	 The	 resulting	 permutations	 of	 identity,	




identity	 and	 state	 formation	 allows	 an	 exploration	 of	 their	 co-constitution.	 The	 analysis	




































































Owing	 to	 the	 conditions	 of	 Westphalian	 export	 to	 MENA,	 nationalism	 and	 sectarianism	
remain,	 in	 the	 region’s	 multi-sectarian	 societies,	 viable	 competing	 identities	 bound	 to	
impact	 on	 state-building.	 In	 principle,	 they	 seem	 to	 have	 potentially	 quite	 different	
consequences	 for	 it:	within	 the	 state,	 nationalism,	 particularly	 civic	 nationalism,	 is	 often	
seen	 to	 be	 universalistic	 and	 inclusive	 of	 those	with	 citizenship,	 hence	most	 compatible	
with	 state-building.	 Many	 scholars	 argue	 (Rustow	 1970;	 Calhoun	 1990)	 that	 a	 unifying	
national	 identity	within	 the	state	 is	crucial	 to	keeping	political	competition	peaceful	over	
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‘who	 gets	what’	 issues.	 Sectarianism,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 identification	
with	a	sub	or	trans-state	religious	community	that	emphasizes	boundaries	with	the	‘other,’	
particularly	when	 involving	 claims	 of	monopoly	 over	 religious	 truth	 as	 the	 principle	 for	
organizing	public	 life.	 It	 is	 associated	with	particularistic	 solidarity	within	 the	group	and	
potential	 enmity	 toward	 the	 ‘other,’	 hence	 may	 be	 politically	 divisive	 and	 lend	 itself	 to	
































continuum	 of	 identity	 patterns	 possible	 in	 a	 society,	 ranging	 from	 more	
universalistic/inclusive	at	one	end	to	particularistic/exclusivist	ones	at	 the	other	pole.	At	
the	 former	 pole	 would	 be	 a	 state	 based	 on	 civic	 nationalism	 inclusive	 of	 all	 who	 have	
citizenship,	with	sectarian	identities	remaining	non-politicized;	at	the	latter	end	would	be	a	
society	 bi-polarized	 by	 militant	 sectarian	 movements	 which	 deny	 membership	 of	 the	
‘other’	 in	 the	political	 community.	Ranged	between	 these	would	be	middle	 cases	 such	as	
one	 wherein	 actors	 simultaneously	 held	 instrumental	 sectarian	 identities	 and	 ethno-
national	 identity,	 as	 in	 much	 of	 the	 Levant.	 Each	 country	 may	 have	 a	 particular	
nationalism-sectarian	“balance.”		
	 Such	 variations	 in	 identity	 patterns	 have	 consequences	 for	 state	 formation.	
Arguably	more	inclusive	identities	enable	more	inclusive	state	institutions	while	exclusivist	
identities	may	make	for	non-inclusive	state	institutions	and	at	the	extremes,	state	failure.	
However,	much	of	actually	existing	politics	 in	MENA	states	 falls	 into	“middle	cases,”	with	
multiple	 identities	 fostering	 hybrid	 state-building	 practices	 that	 instrumentalize	 both	
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sectarianism	 and	 nationalism.	 Before	 looking	 at	 state	 building,	 the	 following	 section	




















29-50;	 Armstrong	 1982).	 In	 MENA	 several,	 largely	 geo-political,	 factors	 obstructed	 a	
Westphalian	 congruence	 of	 nation	 and	 state	 that	 could	 potentially	 have	 marginalized	
competing	sub	and	supra-state	identities,	particularly	sectarianism.		
	 First,	 in	 this	 arid	 region	 of	 trading	 cities	 and	 nomadic	 tribes,	 the	 strongest	
identifications	historically	attached	to	sub-state	units—cities,	tribe,	religious	sects—or	the	
larger	Islamic	umma;	 Islamic	empires	built	on	these	identities	and	since	their	boundaries	
fluctuated	 greatly	 as	 they	 rose	 and	 fell,	 identifications	with	 territorial	 states	were	 tepid	
(Weuleresse	 1946:	 79-83).	 Moreover,	 rule	 was	 exercised	 over	 religious	 communities	
rather	 than	 over	 territory,	 per	 se,	 with	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 caliph	 over	 the	 majority	 Islamic	
umma	and	autonomous	minority	communities	allowed	governance	by	their	own	religious	
leaders.		
	 Arbitrary	Western	 imposition	of	boundaries	 erected	major	 additional	obstacles	 to	
the	 nation-state	 model—while	 inflaming	 the	 grievances	 that	 fed	 Pan	 Arab	 nationalist	
mobilization.	 Insofar	 as	 there	was	 an	 Arab	 proto-nation,	 as	 Arab	 nationalists	 insisted,	 it	
was	 egregiously	 frustrated	 through	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 Arabic-speaking	 world.	 The	
incongruence	between	the	territorial	states	and	pre-existing	supra	and	sub-state	identities,	
exacerbated	by	arbitrary	boundary	imposition	cutting	across	identity	fragmented	societies,	
was	 especially	marked	 in	 the	 Arab	mashreq	where,	 following	 the	 infamous	WWI	 ‘Sykes-
Picot	 agreement,’	 the	 dismantling	 of	 historic	 Syria	 and	 the	 invention	 of	 Iraq	 led	 to	 a	
continuing	 contestation	 of	 the	 new	 states’	 legitimacy	 by	 competing	 supra-	 and	 sub-state	
identity	movements.	Yet	 this	situation	also	allowed--and	governing	was	seen	to	require--
the	 colonial	powers	and	 later	 their	 independent	 successor	 states	 to	 instrumentalize	 sub-
state	 identities	 such	 as	 sectarianism,	 as	 well	 as	 supra-state	 ones.	 Conversely,	 greater	
congruence	of	nation	and	state	was	more	likely	where	statehood	had	a	long	history	within	
borders	 accepted	 by	 colonial	 powers	 (e.g.	 Egypt),	 or	 where	 indigenous	 agency	 shaped	
borders	 in	 opposition	 to	 these	 powers	 (as	 in	 Ataturk’s	 Turkey)	 (Maddy-Weizman	 2006;	
Hinnebusch	2015a).	National	identities	were	more	readily	constructed	around	the	cores	of	
MENA	 empires	 (Ottoman,	 Safavid)	 compared	 to	 the	 imperial	 (Arab)	 peripheries,	 which	
enjoyed	much	less	cohesion.	MENA	state	builders	have	had	to	manipulate,	enhance,	dilute	
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essential	 ingredients	 for	 nation-building.	 Eighty-four	 per	 cent	 of	 states	 have	 a	 majority	
linguistic	 group	 and	 within	 the	 Arab	 world	 Arabic	 speakers	 vastly	 predominate,	
constituting	the	linguistic	basis	of	Arab	nationalism	(Scarritt	2005).	Ethnic	nationalisms--
Arab,	 Iranian	 and	 Turkish--have	 thus	 been	 promoted	 by	 states	 to	 assimilate	 sectarian	
minorities	 sharing	 the	 dominant	 language	 (albeit	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 linguistic	minorities,	
most	notably	 the	Kurds).	Yet,	despite	having	 long	cultural	 roots,	 these	national	 identities	
only	 became	 political	 salient	 because	 of	 structural	 conditions:	 Ottoman	 collapse	 left	 an	






supra-state	 Pan-Arabism	 (referred	 to	 as	 qaumi	 nationalism),	 a	 movement	 seeking	 to	
overcome	the	“artificial”	division	of	the	Arab	nation	into	multiple	statelets	and	bring	nation	
and	state	into	congruence.	In	the	1940-80	period,	it	was	the	hegemonic	identity	in	the	Arab	
world,	 marginalizing	 sub-state	 identities	 such	 as	 sectarianism	 but	 also	 retarding	
consolidation	 of	 state	 nationalisms	 sharply	 distinguished	 from	 those	 of	 other	 Arab	
speaking	 states	 (2016	 polling	 showed	 that	 77%	 of	 respondents	 still	 thought	 the	 Arabs	
made	up	 a	 nation,	 not	multiple	 nations).	Arabism	over	 time	did	 tend	 to	 become	 “banal,”	
appropriated	 by	 individual	 states	 as	 part	 of	 their	 somewhat	 distinct	 identities	 (Phillips	
2013);	this,	however,	meant	Arab	states	had	to	retain	Pan-Arabism	as	part	of	their	identity	
discourse	 which	 helped	 reproduce	 it.	 Also,	 it	 tended	 to	 make	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	
individual	Arab	governments	contingent	on	their	being	seen	to	defend	the	common	Arab	
cause—not	 individual	 state	 sovereignty--in	 their	 foreign	 policies.	 But	 what	 most	
powerfully	 continually	 reproduced	 Arab	 nationalism	 was	 the	 on-going	 struggle	 over	
Palestine,	the	threat	from	Israel	and	regular	Western	intervention	in	the	region.	
	 The	main	basis	of	identity	distinction	within	(and	to	some	extent	between)	states	in	
MENA	 is	 religious—i.e.	 what	 will	 appear	 within	 any	 given	 state	 as	 different	 sectarian	
communities	 (Wimmer	 2015).	 The	 sectarian	 inheritance	 of	multi-sectarian	 societies	 is	 a	
product	 of	 the	 long	 duree	 and	 sectarian	 identities	 have	 some	 advantage	 over	 state	
nationalism	 in	MENA	 in	 that	 they	are	more	ascriptive--transmitted	by	descent,	and	often	
constituted	 in	 face-to-face	 real	 (not	 imaginary)	 ‘little	 communities,’	 hence	 readily	
reinforced	by	socialization	via	kin	and	peer	groups.	As	such,	variations	in	the	demographic	





state	 groups	 not	 sharply	 divided	 or	 those	 with	 a	 large	 majority	 and	 several	 smaller	
minorities	 in	which	 assimilation	 into	 a	 larger	 shared	 national	 identity	was	more	 likely).	
Whether	 polarization	 actually	 results	 will	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 kind—intensity--of	
sectarianism:	 if	 sectarian	 differences	 are	 unpoliticized,	 it	 will	 likely	 be	 low;	 if	
instrumentalized,	medium;	and	under	militant	sectarianism,	high.			
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	 In	 summary,	 state	 builders	 were	 both	 constrained	 by	 and	 yet	 could	 often	 also	




Mass	 nationalism	 is	 a	 function	 of	 modernization,	 notably	 social	 mobilization	 (spread	 of	
mass	education,	literacy,	media,	etc.)	which	allows	a	broadening	of	identities	beyond	sub-
state	 ones	 to	 become	 congruent	 with	 the	 state;	 an	 integrated	 market	 economy	 and	
infrastructure	within	 state	borders	also	 facilitates	 the	 interactions	 that	 facilitate	national	
identity	 (Hall	 1998;	 Gellner	 1983;	 Taylor	 1998).	 As	 expected,	 MENA	modernization	 has	
indeed	 been	 associated	with	 nationalism	 and	 to	 the	more	 it	 has	 become	 hegemonic,	 the	
more	it	has	tended	to	subsume	or	de-politicize	the	particularistic/localistic	identities	that	





against	 ruling	 oligarchies	 seen	 as	 subservient	 to	 imperialism,	 subsuming	 and	
overshadowing	sectarian	differences	among	the	middle	and	lower	classes	(Gershoni	1996).	
	 Yet	 modernization	 can	 also	 increase	 the	 salience	 of	 sectarian	 identities	 since	 it	
increases	competition	over	scarce	resources	and,	 in	modernizing	societies,	as	 individuals	
leave	their	 ‘little	communities’	to	compete	in	the	wider	social	arena,	sectarianism	is	often	
instrumentalized	 in	 group	 struggles	 over	 material	 resources.	 In	 MENA,	 this	 started	
happening	from	the	1970s	as	states,	in	receipt	of	large	oil	or	aid	revenues,	distributed	these	
resources	 via	 clientele	 networks,	 sometimes	 based	 on	 sect;	 in	 periods	 when	 falling	 oil	
prices	decreased	 resource	 supply	while,	with	 continuing	population	 growth,	 competition	
intensified,	 losers	 might	 attribute	 unequal	 outcomes	 to	 sectarian	 discrimination,	 raising	
sectarian	consciousness.		
	 Whether	 modernization	 leads	 to	 more	 inclusive	 national	 identities	 or	 reinforces	
particularistic	 ones	 such	 as	 sect	 depends	 how	 the	 interaction	 of	 class	 (horizontal)	 and	
communal	(vertical)	cleavages	affects	levels	and	axes	of	conflict.	Thus,	sectarian	cleavages	
can	 retard	 class	 consciousness	 while	 if	 class	 and	 communal	 cleavages	 overlap	 and	
reinforce	 each	other	 (e.g.	 one	 communal	 group	 constituting	 the	upper	 class	 and	 another	
the	lower	class)	violent	sectarian	conflict	and	high	sectarian	consciousness	is	more	likely;	if	
class	and	communal	cleavages	cross-cut	and	dilute	each	other,	prospects	 for	an	 inclusive	
nationalism	 able	 to	 subsume	 sectarian	 identities	 increase	 (Grove	 1987);	 while	 if	 class	
subsumes	 sectarian	 identities,	 a	 cross-sectarian	 revolutionary	 nationalism	 may	 result	





While	 structure	 constrains	 possibilities,	 actual	 outcomes	 depend	 on	 agency:	 identity	
change	and	 reproduction	are	promoted	by	political	 entrepreneurs	 in	power	 struggles.	 In	
periods	of	identity	contestation,	as	is	often	typical	of	the	Middle	East,	outcomes	depend	on	
the	struggle	of	competing	actors	trying	to	tip	the	balance	among	identity	possibilities.			
	 Nationalism	in	MENA	was,	 in	 the	 first	place,	a	 function	of	mobilization	against	 the	
colonizer,	when	nationalist	movements	 and	parties	 arose	 across	 the	 region;	 the	 struggle	
with	 the	 imperialist	 “other”	 tended	 to	 subsume	 non-national	 identities	 and	 the	 more	
lengthy	 and	 intense	 the	 national	 struggle	 and	 the	 more	 imperialist-drawn	 borders,	
frustrated,	 rather	 than	 satisfied	 identities,	 the	 more	 powerful	 was	 anti-imperialist	
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community,	 the	 economic	 modernization	 facilitated	 by	 enhanced	 integration,	 and	 the	
mobilization	 of	 power	 in	 international	 competition.	 Particularly	 if	 there	 is	 a	 pre-existing	




governance	 of	 a	 territory,	 and	 the	material	 accoutrements	 of	 statehood—bureaucracies,	





While	 the	promotion	of	 inclusive	nationalism	 is	 rational	 for	 elites	over	 the	 longer	
term,	 in	 short	 term	 power	 struggles	 in	 multi-communal	 societies,	 particularly	 where	
ascriptive	 identities	 appear	 ‘ready-made’	 vehicles	 of	 political	 mobilization,	 ruling	 elites	
may	seek	to	mobilize	their	own	communal	group	and	instrumentalize	communal	cleavages,	
notably	 sectarianism,	 to	 ‘divide	 and	 rule;’	 while	 counter-elites	 representing	 excluded	
groups	 have	 incentives	 to	 counter-mobilize	 other	 sub/trans-state	 identities	 against	
regimes	 (Binder	 1999;	 Peleg	 2007).	 Such	 scenarios	 carry	 risks	 of	 civil	 war	 that	 may	
precipitate	degrees	of	state	failure	(Hashemi	2015)	in	which	sectarianism	tends	to	flourish	
at	the	expense	of	nationalism.	
Between	 these	 two	poles,	 state	elites	may	deploy	hybrid	 strategies	 that	mix	more	
and	less	inclusive	identities	and	practices.	 Indeed,	because	state	territorial	nationalism	in	
the	 Arab	 world	 was	 never	 strong	 enough	 to	 marginalize	 supra	 and	 sub-state	 identities,	
state	elites	typically	tried	to	exploit	all	three	levels	of	identity.	They	might	win	the	loyalty	of	







they	 promote	 in	 their	 geo-political	 struggles	 readily	 penetrate	 other	 (highly	 permeable)	
MENA	states.	 Supra-state	 identities	have	been	 constructed	and	 instrumentalized	by	 rival	
regional	powers,	with	e.g.	Nasser’s	Egypt	promoting	secular	Pan-Arabism	in	the	1950s-60s,	
and	 Islamic	 Iran	 seeking	 to	 export	 revolutionary	Pan-Islam	 in	 the	1980s	 (Barnett	1998).	
The	former	de-legitimized	the	instrumentalization	of	‘traditional’	divisive	identities	such	as	
sectarianism	 and	 tribalism,	 but	 the	 1967	 defeat	 by	 Israel	 destroyed	 its	 hegemony;	 this	
precipitated	 a	 turn	 to	 Islam,	 accelerated	 by	 the	 Iran’s	 Islamic	 revolution	 that,	 although	
explicitly	 framed	as	anti-sectarian,	nevertheless	paved	the	way	 for	sectarianism	in	 that	 it	
put	 religion	 in	 the	 public	 sphere,	 such	 that	 political	 divisions	 would	 start	 to	 take	 a	
religious—sectarian--form.	However,	 it	was	 the	 instrumentalization	 by	 Saudi	Arabia	 and	
Iran	of	 Sunni-Shia	differences	 that	 stimulated	 a	powerful	 sectarian	bi-polarization	 in	 the	
region,	pushing	aside	more	inclusive	identities.	That,	in	turn,	was	largely	an	outcome	of	the	
regional	power	struggles	set	off	by	multiple	state	failures	across	the	region,	beginning	with	






and	 the	 agency	 of	 state	 builders;	 thus,	 the	 flawed	 export	 of	 Westphalian	 statehood	
constituted	the	“hands’	dealt	state	builders	in	the	political	game;	but	how	they	played	their	
hands	 mattered	 for	 the	 balance	 of	 nationalism	 and	 sectarianism.	 As	 argued	 by	
institutionalist	 approaches	 to	 understanding	 identity,	 political	 institutions	 can	 help	
produce,	reproduce	or	transform	identities,	depending	on	their	design.		
	 The	 most	 general	 way	 in	 which	 states	 may	 vary	 in	 design,	 following	 historical	
sociologist	 such	 as	Huntington	 (1968)	 and	Mann	 (2008),	 are:	 1)	 centralization	 of	 power	
and	infrastructural	penetration	of	society	by	state	institutions	(institutionalization);	and	2)	
inclusion	in	political	institutions	of	social	forces	(participation).	At	one	end	of	a	continuum,	
are	 located	 strong	 states	 high	 on	 both	 dimensions.	 They	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 give	 most	
identity	 groups	 representation,	 regulate	 their	 competition	 peacefully	 and	 provide	 the	
security	 and	 public	 goods	 that	 foster	 citizen	 loyalty	 to	 the	 nation,	 hence	 are	 fairly	
impermeable	to	trans-state	identities	manipulated	from	without.	At	the	other	end	are	weak	
states	 that	 lack	 both	 centralization	 of	 power	 and	 sufficient	 inclusion,	 hence	 lacking	 the	
capacity	to	satisfy	citizen	needs,	with	the	result	that	their	loyalties	are	more	likely	to	take	a	
sub-state	(ethnic	or	sectarian)	form,	readily	inflamed	from	without.	Actually	existing	states	
in	MENA	 tend	 to	 take	 up	middle	 positions	 along	 a	 continuum	between	 two	 ideal-typical	




first	 the	 concentration	of	power	at	 the	 centre,	 in	which	 rival	 state	builders	 are	defeated,	
and	 the	 penetration	 of	 society	 and	 territory	 by	 state	 infrastructure;	 only	 later	 was	 the	




between	 concentrating	 power	 at	 the	 inter-elite	 level	 and	 expanding	 it	 through	 inclusive	
mass	participation	and	social	redistribution.	Since	it	is	hard	to	get	this	right,	various	form	
of	imbalances	are	typical.	
In	 MENA	 such	 imbalances	 between	 institutionalization	 and	 inclusion	 are	 typical.	
Thus,	 a	 multi-sectarian	 state	 may	 be	 relatively	 inclusive	 but	 owing	 to	 deficient	
institutionalization,	 vulnerable	 to	 sectarian	mobilization	 and	 highly	 permeable	 to	 trans-
state	 sectarianism	 (Lebanon’s	 ‘consociationalism’).	 Authoritarian	 states	 low	 in	 inclusion	
may	be	sufficiently	institutionalized	to	repress	opposition	for	a	time,	but	the	grievances	of	
excluded	 groups	 makes	 them	 susceptible	 to	 anti-regime	 mobilization	 if	 state	 capacity	




Further	 complicating	matters,	 the	 two	dimensions	 of	 state	 formation	need	not	 be	
either	 high	 or	 low	 and	 states	 can,	 e.g.	 combine	medium	 institutionalization	 and	medium	
inclusion	 in	 various	 ways;	 in	 such	 cases,	 institutions’	 impact	 on	 identity	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
mixed,	 possibly	 reproducing	 both	 nationalism	 and	 sectarianism.	 In	 MENA,	 in	 fact,	 such	
medium	 scenarios	 were	 typical	 in	 the	 first	 decades	 of	 post-colonial	 state-building,	 in	
particular,	the	use	of	hybrid	neo-patrimonial	practices.	
	 With	 decolonization,	 MENA	 state-builders,	 unable	 to	 depend	 on	 sufficient	
legitimation	 from	state-centred	nationalism,	widely	 instrumentalized	 sub-state	 identities,	
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such	 as	 tribalism	 and	 sectarianism,	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 patrimonial	 authority.	 This,	
typically	combined	with	Weberian	bureaucratic	practices	and	structures,	resulted	in	hybrid	
neo-patrimonial	 authoritarian	 regimes	 (Bacik	 2008).	 However,	 variations	 in	 neo-
patrimonial	 practices	made	 for	 variations	 in	 inclusion,	 hence	 in	 identity.	 Specifically,	 the	
relative	balance	of	patrimonial	vs.	bureaucratic	authority	in	any	given	regime	had	bearing	
on	 institutionalization	 and	 inclusion:	 the	 more	 patrimonial	 the	 regime,	 the	 more	 likely	
elites	would	instrumentalize	sectarianism	(and	other	sub-state	identities)	at	the	expense	of	
bureaucratic	 rationality	 and	 inclusiveness—for	 example	 by	 sectarian	 recruitment	 of	
military/security	forces	and	encouraging	inter-sectarian	conflict	among	the	public	in	order	
to	 divide,	 exclude,	 and	 rule.	 These	 practices	 enervated	 institutions	 that	 are	 needed	 to	
incorporate	cross-class,	cross-sectarian	coalitions	that	could	dilute	sectarianism	and	make	
for	 more	 robust	 states.	 Conversely,	 the	 more	 the	 bureaucratic	 side	 of	 the	 regime	 is	
developed--with	recruitment	at	least	partly	on	merit	grounds	enhancing	rationality	in	the	
bureaucracy;	 equal	 treatment	 before	 the	 law;	 and	 institutions	 such	 as	 political	 parties	
designed	 to	 organize	 participation	 and	 co-opt	 cross-class,	 cross-sectarian	 coalitions--the	
more	 inclusionary	 the	 regime	 and	 the	 more	 likely	 identities	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 state—in	
other	words,	national	identity.		
	 Variations	 in	 inclusion	 were	 shaped	 by	 the	 origins	 of	 Arab	 regimes:	 more	
inclusionary	forms	of	populist	authoritarianism	(PA)	rose	out	of	nationalist	movements	and	
revolutionary	 coups	 against	 old	 oligarchies,	 which	 sought	 to	 mobilize	 and	 incorporate	
worker	 and	 peasant	 constituencies	 through	 single	 party	 and	 corporatist	 institutions,	 in	
order	to	exclude	the	old	oligarchy	and	other	political	rivals.	These	regimes	were	explicitly	
legitimized	 by	 combinations	 of	 Arab	 nationalism	 and	 a	 populist	 social	 contract	 in	which	
regimes	 traded	 political	 support	 for	 citizens’	 material	 entitlements,	 regardless	 of	 their	
communal	origins.	Such	regimes	tended	to	incorporate	cross-sectarian	middle-lower	class	
coalitions	 that	 diluted	 the	 sectarian	 identifications	 that	 were	 simultaneously	 being	
reproduced	by	the	patrimonial	practices	they	used	to	consolidate	power	around	the	leader.	
	 However,	populism	was	an	artefact	of	the	neo-Keysian	Cold	War	global	order	when	
rival	 world	 (communist	 and	 capitalist)	 cores	 provided	 considerable	material	 benefits	 to	
periphery	 states	 and	 global	 norms	 promoted	 egalitarian	 development	 strategies.	 In	 the	
subsequent	neo-liberal	post-Cold	War	era,	 regimes,	 facing	declining	patronage	resources,	
became	vulnerable	 to	global	neo-liberal	pressures	 to	 renege	on	 the	social	 contract,	 elites	
absorbed	the	neo-liberal	norms	that	encouraged	self-enrichment,	and	also	re-aligned	their	
foreign	 policies	 and	 alliances	 toward	 the	 West,	 thus	 abandoning	 the	 Arab	 nationalist	
component	 of	 their	 legitimation.	 They	 typically	 evolved	 into	post-populist	regimes	 (PPA)	
that	 remained	 authoritarian	 but	 reversed	 their	 constituencies,	 incorporating	 new	
privileged	 crony	 capitalists	 and	excluding	 the	 lower	 strata.	 Such	 redistribution	of	wealth	
upward	 typically	 affected	 sectarian	 communities	 unequally,	 stimulating	 a	 sense	 of	
sectarian	discrimination	and	a	withdrawal	of	loyalty	to	the	state	among	the	losers.	
	 At	 the	far	end	of	 the	continuum	from	strong	states	 is	 located	the	extreme	nadir	of	
state	 formation—failed	 states	 with	 at	 least	 partly	 collapsed	 institutions	 and	 loss	 of	 a	
monopoly	of	 legitimate	violence	over	 territory.	 State	weakening	 in	multi-sectarian	 states	
can,	under	conditions	of	increased	exclusion	and	instrumentalization	of	sectarianism,	open	
the	door	 to	 sectarian	 civil	war	 and	possible	 state	 failure.	The	 collapse	of	 order	 in	 failing	
states,	according	to	Zartman	(1995:	1),	often	brings	about	a	‘retreat’	to	sub-state	identities:	
people	may	 transfer	 their	 loyalties	 from	 the	 state	 to	 an	 armed	 sectarian	 group	 (Byman	
2015).	This	may	generate	security	dilemmas,	(Posen	1993)	wherein	each	communal	group,	
seeing	 the	 other	 as	 a	 threat,	 acts	 pre-emptively	 to	 increase	 its	 own	 security—e.g.	 via	
militias	 and	 sectarian	 cleansing--in	 a	way	 that	makes	 all	 less	 secure,	 thereby	 increasing	
perceptions	 of	 existential	 threat	 from	 the	 ‘other.’	 In	 parallel,	 external	 powers	 frequently	
intervene	 in	 failing	 states	 to	 empower	 friendly	 forces—often	 using	 groups	 sharing	 their	
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communal	 identity	 to	 conduct	 proxy	wars—thus	 exacerbating	 the	 conflict.	 Failing	 states	
provide	 perfect	 breeding	 grounds	 for	 fostering	 the	 most	 militant	 exclusionary	 forms	 of	
sectarianism	at	the	expense	of	inclusive	national	identity.	Finally,	in	state	failure	scenarios	
‘competitive	 regime	 re-formation’	 is	 precipitated	 in	 which	 the	 rival	 contenders	 seek	 to	
mobilize	 constituencies	 on	 communal	 grounds	 to	 re-establish	 regimes,	 but	 with	 more	
coercive	and	exclusionary	forms	of	governance	(Heydemann	2013).		 	
	 As	 the	 above	 suggests,	 state	 formation	 in	 MENA	 has	 described,	 not	 a	 linear	
increasing	approximation	of	the	Weberian	state	but	rather	a	bell-shaped	curve,	 increasing	
from	 a	 low	 point	 at	 independence,	 when	 states	 were	 highly	 vulnerable	 to	 trans-state	
penetration	by	Pan-Arab	identity	discourse	and	reaching	a	high	point	in	the	1970-1980s	as	
regimes	 instituted	 inclusive	 populist	 social	 contracts	 and	 built	 larger	 more	 penetrative	
bureaucracies,	 enabled	 in	 part	 by	 oil	 rent,	 allowing	 middle	 classes	 to	 be	 co-opted,	
boundaries	 made	 less	 permeable	 and	 state	 identities	 strengthened.	 However,	 they	 then	
declined	 under	 the	 impact	 of	 globalization,	 which	 drove	 a	 move	 toward	 post-populist	
exclusion.	Periphery	states	were	caught	 in	a	pincer	between	neo-liberalization	promoted	




The	 foregoing	analysis	 can	be	 summarized	 in	 the	 following	model	 for	understanding	 the	








think)	 since	 the	mobilizing	power	 of	 an	 identity	 is	 rooted	 in	 shared	historical	memories	
and	 cultural	 ingredients,	 such	 as	 language	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 sectarian	 groups	 in	 a	
society,	which	 are	 both	 constructed	 over	 the	 long	duree	 (Armstrong	 1982,	 Smith	 1995);	
once	 constructed,	 they	 constitute	 “social	 facts”	 that	 shape	 individuals’	 self-identities	 and	
ideas	of	their	interests.	In	MENA,	sectarianism	and	linguistic-based	nationalism	are	two	of	
the	most	powerful	enduring	identities.	
	 Yet,	 far	 from	 fixed,	 identities	 must	 constantly	 be	 reproduced	 e.g.	 through	
socialization	 practices.	 Further	 contributing	 to	 contingency	 is	 that	 there	 are	 always	
multiple	identities	and	interpretations	of	them	(e.g.,	watani	vs.	qaumi	nationalism,	banal	vs.	
militant	 sectarianism),	 some	 of	 which	 can	 be	 held	 simultaneously,	 with	 the	 balance	









	 Differences	 in	 the	 nationalism-sectarian	 balance	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	 way	
permutations	of	 the	 identity	heritage	 and	modernization	 interact.	 	At	 one	pole,	 the	most	




sectarian	 groups	 lacking	 cross-cutting	 class	 identities.	 Conversely,	 national	 identities	 can	
prevail	 even	 in	 multi-sectarian	 societies	 if	 there	 is	 a	 shared	 language	 and	 memories	 of	
















centralized,	 inclusive--institutions	 fostering	 nationalism;	 conversely,	 non-inclusive	 weak	
institutions	 tend	 to	 foster	 less	 inclusive	 identities—most	 likely	 sectarian	 ones	 in	 multi-
sectarian	 societies.	 Hybrid	 (neo-patrimonial)	 institutions	 foster	 both	 nationalism	 and	
sectarianism,	 with	 the	 balance	 dependent	 on	 their	 patrimonial-bureaucratic	 mix,	 hence	
levels	of	 centralization	and	 inclusion.	The	extreme	case,	 state	failure,	may	 foster	militant	




The	utility	of	 the	above	 framework	can	be	 illustrated	by	applying	 it	 to	Syria,	where	state	
formation	 and	 identities	 have	 co-varied	 significantly	 over	 time:	 starting	 as	 a	weak	 state,	
Syria	 underwent	 sufficient	 centralization	 and	 inclusion	 to	 reach	 medium	 levels	 of	 state	
formation	(1970s)	before	declining	into	the	current	partial	state	failure;	this	was	paralleled	










state	 Pan-Arabism	 or	 Pan-Islam.	 Competing	 nationalisms	 tended	 to	 split	 the	 nationalist	
movement	 into	 Pan	 Arab,	 Syria-centric,	 and	 Islamic	 variants.	 Moreover,	 there	 was	 a	
multitude	 of	 sub-state	 identity	 communities,	 sometimes	 concentrated	 in	 particular	 areas	
(e.g.,	 the	 Alawi	 and	 Druze	 mountains).	 Still,	 over	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 Syrians	 were	 Arabic	
speakers	 and	74	per	 cent	 Sunni	Muslim,	 a	 distribution	of	 sectarian	 groups	 that	deterred	
polarization	 (in	 spite	 of	 French	 attempts	 to	 divide	 and	 rule)	 and	 was	 compatible	 with	




politicians	 framed	 their	 ideologies	 in	 inclusive	 nationalist	 terms	 and	 refrained	 from	
instrumentalization	 of	 sectarian	 identities,	which	were	 little	 politicized;	 rather,	 sectarian	
minorities	 sought	 integration	 into	 Arab	 national	 identity	 in	 parallel	with	modernization,	
hence	their	social	mobilization,	e.g.	travel	of	rurals	for	education	in	the	city.		




This	 institutional	 configuration—partially	 exclusionary	 on	 class	 but	 not	 sectarian	 lines	
meant	that,	as	the	new	middle	class	and	peasantry	mobilized	against	the	ruling	oligarchy,	
class	 politics	 subsumed	 sectarian	 divisions.	 Additionally,	 anti-regime	 mobilization	 was	
advanced	 by	 a	 successful	 depiction	 of	 the	 oligarchy	 as	 linked	 to	 imperialism,	 fusing	 the	
class	and	national	issues	and	promoting	a	revolutionary	version	of	nationalism.		
	 The	Ba’th	party	was	the	most	successful	of	several	radical	middle	class	parties	that	
challenged	 the	 post-independence	 ruling	 oligarchy.	 It	 integrated	 the	 sectarian	minorities	






most	 embraced	 was	 supra-state	 Pan-Arabism,	 loyalty	 to	 the	 Syrian	 state	 was	 diluted,	
irredentism	 (dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 truncation	 of	 Syria	 by	 the	 Imperial	 powers)	












origins).	 Within	 the	 small	 intra-elite	 regime	 arena,	 the	 closer-knit	 sectarian	 minorities	
(Alawis,	 Druze)	 were	 better	 able	 to	 instrumentalize	 sectarian	 ties	 than	 the	 regionally-
divided	Sunni	Muslim	Ba’thists,	who	tended	to	lose	out	in	power	struggles,	increasing	the	




	 In	 spite	 of	 this,	 the	 Ba’th	 regime	 was	 institutionalized	 under	 Hafiz	 al-Asad	 as	 a	
populist	version	of	neo-patrimonialism	that	instrumentalized	multiple	identities,	deploying	
sectarianism	 in	 power	 concentration	 but	 diluting	 it	 via	 inclusive	 institutions	 and	 the	
promotion	of	Arab	national	 identity,	a	formula	that	 incorporated	a	significant	social	base.	
The	patrimonial	president	appointed	trusted	Alawi	officers	to	command	of	elite	army	units	
and	 the	 security	 forces.	 Also,	 however,	 senior	 Sunni	 politicos	 and	military	 officers	 in	 his	
inner	circle	 incorporated	their	own	clientele	networks;	Alawi	officers	had	Sunni	business	
partners--a	 ‘military-mercantile	 complex’	 centred	 on	 Damascus.	 ‘Sectarian	 arithmetic’	
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ensured	 representation	 of	 all	 sectarian	 groups	 in	 the	 party	 politburo	 and	 government	
council	of	ministers.	At	the	base,	the	cross-sectarian	rural	constituency	that	the	Ba’th	party	
had	mobilized	 in	 the	 1950s	was	 incorporated	 and	 expanded,	with	 the	 party	 penetrating	
and	 co-opting	 Sunni	 as	 well	 a	 minority	 villages,	 particularly	 where	 land	 reform	
redistributed	 land	 to	 peasants.	 The	 rhetoric	 of	 revolution	 fostered	 anti-oligarchic	 class	
identities.	 A	 populist	 social	 contract	 traded	 political	 loyalty	 for	 benefits,	 regardless	 of	




	 	From	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Ba’th’s	 power	 seizure,	 its	most	 durable	 opposition	was	 the	
Muslim	 Brotherhood,	 allied	 with	 elements	 of	 the	 merchant	 class,	 old	 oligarchy	 and	
politicized	 Muslim	 clergy.	 The	 half	 of	 society	 that	 felt	 excluded	 from	 the	 regime	
sympathized	 with	 the	 Brotherhood.	 The	 salience	 of	 sectarianism	 increased	 during	 the	
periodic	 anti-regime	 mobilizations	 led	 by	 the	 Brotherhood	 but	 especially	 during	 its	
attempted	 insurgency	 of	 1978-82,	 which	 was	 framed	 as	 a	 Sunni	 movement	 against	
heretical	ruling	minorities.	The	Brotherhood	could	only	hope	to	win	by	a	sectarian	arousal	
of	 the	 Sunni	majority,	 but	 its	message	 remained	 largely	urban	 in	 appeal—e.g.	 its	 call	 for	
reversal	of	the	land	reform	was	sure	to	alienate	peasants.	The	Sunni	population	was	split	
(e.g.	 secular-Islamist;	 urban-rural),	 the	 party	 and	 army	 did	 not	 unravel	 along	 sectarian	
lines	when	called	upon	to	use	massive	repression	against	the	Brotherhood	(e.g.	the	siege	of	
Hama)	 and	 the	 Sunni	 peasants	 and	Damascene	 bourgeoisie	 stayed	 co-opted.	 Institutions	
were	inclusive	enough	that	party	and	nationalist	identities	held	against	sectarian	ones.	The	
period,	however,	left	a	permanent	mark	on	society:	resentment	in	the	repressed	northern	
Sunni	 cities	 and	 towns,	 and,	 among	 the	 Alawis,	 a	 feeling	 of	 vulnerability	 to	 Sunni	
revanchism--a	latent	security	dilemma.		




the	Arab	 countries	 and	 as	 the	most	 steadfast	 defender	of	 the	Arabs	 against	 Zionism	and	
imperialism.	 Indeed,	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 virtual	 national	 security	 state	 able	 to	 hold	 its	
own	 in	 several	 wars	 against	 Israel	 as	 well	 as	 on-going	 war	 preparation	 endowed	 the	
regime	with	Arab	nationalist	legitimacy	as	well	as	fostering	a	Syrian	territorial	nationalism	
(focused	 on	 recovery	 of	 the	 lost	 Golan	 Heights).	 Sectarianism	 was	 seen	 as	 illegitimate,	
operating	covertly	in	the	form	of	wasta	in	accessing	privilege	or	in	resentment	against	such	
privilege.	 The	 regime	 thus	 exploited	 both	 supra-state	 (Pan-Arabism)	 state	 (Syrian	 civic	
nationalism),	class,	and	sectarian	 identities	 to	 legitimize	 itself.	This	helped	both	to	attach	
loyalties	 to	 the	 Syrian	 state	 and	 also	 to	 reproduce	 sub	 and	 supra-state	 identities	 that	
potentially	diluted	identification	with	it	(Hinnebusch	2001:	65-88;	Hinnebusch	1990:	144-
275).	 In	 parallel,	 Syria	 became	 a	 stronger	 more	 integrated	 state,	 materially	 penetrated	
from	the	centre.	Hafiz	al-Asad’s	state	building	 turned	Syria	 from	a	victim	 into	a	player	 in	




Hafiz’s	 regime	 had	 depended	 on	 the	 availability	 of	 rent	 for	 patronage	 and	when,	 under	





power,	 losing	 with	 them	 their	 clientele	 networks	 among	 Sunni	 sub-elites.	 Second,	 the	
concentration	 of	 the	 new	 business	 opportunities	 from	 the	 neo-liberal	 opening	 to	




devastating	 drought,	 cost	 the	 regime	 the	 support	 of	 its	 peasant	 and	 lower	 class	
constituencies.	Thus,	the	patrimonial	core	of	the	regime	became	both	more	sectarian	and	
more	 upper-class.	 In	 parallel,	 the	 societal	 penetration	 of	 regime	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	
ruling	 party,	 contracted	 and	 the	 over-concentration	 of	 patronage	 shrunk	 its	 co-optative	
capacity.	As	resources	became	sharply	skewed	 in	 the	hands	of	a	 few	regime	 insiders	and	
clients,	while	others	experienced	downward	pressure	on	their	living	standards,	the	losers	
saw	 themselves	 as	 victims	 of	 sectarian	 discrimination.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 regime’s	
encouragement	 of	 non-political	 Islam,	 first	 began	 under	 Hafiz,	 enabled	 the	 spread	 of	
Islamism	beyond	its	former	urban	concentration	into	the	suburbs	and	countryside	where	it	
prepared	 the	 ideological	 ground	 for	 rural-based	 Islamist	 insurrection	 (Hinnebusch	 and	
Zintl	 2014).	 Thus,	 even	 a	 state	 long	 relatively	 immune	 to	 globalization	 was	 squeezed	




The	Syrian	uprising	was	 initially	not	overtly	about	sectarianism	although	 it	 later	became	
‘sectarianized’	 (Abboud	 2016:	 183-86);	 Rather,	 its	 roots	 were	 in	 the	 class	 disparities	
generated	under	the	retreat	 from	populism	to	crony	capitalism	(Donati	2013).	Moreover,	
initial	 protests,	 spearheaded	 by	 secular	 educated	 urban	 youth,	 often	 of	 rural	 cross-





constituency.	 Given	 the	weakening	 of	 Ba’thism	 as	 an	 ideology	 and	 an	 organization	with	
mass	roots,	the	regime	had	no	ability	to	counter-mobilize	a	broad-based	defence	(as	it	had	




anti-Alawi	 and	 Sunni	 sectarian	 discourse	 and	 as	 it	 also	 militarized,	 sectarian	 Islamist	
ideologies	 became	 the	 most	 effective	 recruitment	 tools;	 as	 anti-regime	 mobilization	
deepened,	 the	 plebeian	 losers	 of	 neo-liberal	 policies,	 who	were	more	 likely	 to	 interpret	
their	 plight	 as	 sectarian	 discrimination,	 assumed	 greater	 weight	 in	 the	 opposition.	 As	
Alawis,	disproportionately	making	up	the	security	services,	suffered	a	large	proportion	of	
casualties,	 their	 in-group	 solidarity	 around	 the	 regime	was	 reinforced.	 Rival	 intervening	
external	powers—Sunni	powers	on	one	side,	Shia	Iran	on	the	other--in	instrumentalizing,	
sectarianism,	exacerbated	it.	As	jihadists	poured	into	Syria	to	fight	the	regime,	funded	and	
armed	 by	 anti-Asad	 regional	 powers,	 while	 secular	 armed	 opposition	 groups	 were	
marginalized	or	Islamized,	especially	as	secular	urban	middle	class	protestors	exited	Syria	
and	 were	 replaced	 by	 Islamized	 rural	 youth	 as	 the	 foot-soldiers	 of	 the	 uprising.	 The	
country	 was	 moving	 toward	 sectarian	 bi-polarization	 (Phillips	 2015;	 Balanche	 2018;	
Bartolomei	2018).	








Syrians	 started	 to	 identify	 with	 non-Syrian	 fellow	 sectarians	 intervening	 in	 the	 Syrian	
conflict	rather	than	with	citizens	of	the	other	sectarian	identity	(Rifai	2018;	Abboud	2016:	
97-108,	162-87)		




extreme	 sectarian	 discourse	 (Lund	 2013).	 The	 very	 notion	 of	 the	 nation	 was	 being	
reconstructed	 in	 sectarian	 terms,	 with	 regime	 and	 jihadists	 both	 depicting	 the	 other	 as	
outside	 the	nation	or	umma.	Nevertheless,	a	Syrian	state	 identity	survived,	manifested	 in	
the	 opposition	 to	 the	 partition	 of	 the	 country	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 except	 for	
extreme	 jihadists.	 And	 the	 regime	 remained	 standing,	 determined	 to	 restore	 territorial	
sovereignty.	
	






	 The	export	of	 the	 states	 system	 to	 the	 region,	 creating	multi-sectarian	 states	with	
arbitrary	borders,	as	in	Syria,	established	a	context	in	which	state	nationalism	struggled	to	
subsume	 alternative	 identities	 such	 as	 sectarianism.	 Sectarian	 identities	 have	 deep	
historical	roots,	but	their	intensity	and	politicization	varied	and	they	were	usually	diluted	





an	 inclusive	 and	 revolutionary	 form	 of	 nationalism	 that	 marginalized	 sectarianism,	 but	
destabilized	the	state.	Remarkably,	Syria	reached	its	state	formation	highpoint	under	Hafiz	
al-Asad	when	both	nationalism	and	sectarianism	were	instrumentalized	to	create	a	populist	
neo-patrimonial	 regime	 with	 institutions	 incorporating	 a	 cross-sectarian	 coalition	 and	
designed	for	the	struggle	with	Israel.	Under	Bashar	al-Asad,	reversal	of	the	populist	social	
contract,	 debilitating	 this	 coalition,	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	 Uprising	 wherein	 the	
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